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Abstract:
In this thesis I will examine the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the
context of the 21st century, particularly looking at the Syrian crises and analyzing why R2P has
not been utilized in Syria. In order to do this, I will firstly analyze the evolution of international
law to include intervention based on the prevention of human rights violations, international
legal theory, and the case studies of Syria and Libya. I will also analyze the philosophy of liberal
internationalism and how it has been used to craft R2P. Finally, I will critique the principle using
the Syrian Civil War. In writing this thesis, I plan to examine the future of humanitarian
intervention, and how it has been perverted since the first usage of it in the twentieth century.

I.

Introduction
On March 3, 2012, chemical warfare rained down on Syrian civilians in Damascus and

Aleppo. About 25 people were killed in the attacks from a mixture of mustard and sarin gas
(Friedman 2013). The United States and the international community expressed outrage
following the attacks. President Barack Obama made the official statement that his calculations
on a military response would change significantly if the United States sees “a whole bunch of
chemical weapons moving around or being utilized” (Shoham 2016). This declaration from
Obama and the violent chemical weapon use from President Bashar Al-Assad of Syria was the
first time I personally ever associated conflict with Syria, a country from which more than half of
my family hails. To me, Syria was a place of rich heritage and culture, not the war-torn
battleground many believe it to be today. I wanted so badly for the conflict to end and for
America to step in and save my family who remained there. However, as I have grown up, I
realized that while the international community has the power to intervene in Syria, it has fallen
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short in aiding the Syrian people. The consequences of this lack of action are best illustrated by
the situation of my family there, who I have not received any word from or news about in four
years.
My research question is why has the legal norm the Responsibility to Protect (or R2P), failed
to be applied in Syria and what does this say about the future of humanitarian intervention in the
international system? To answer this question, I will be examining the history and evolution of
R2P, including the failure to act in the Rwandan Genocide and how the principle was first
applied to the human rights crisis in Libya. I will also provide the background on the Syrian Civil
War and the politics of the Assad regime, and examine why R2P has not been applied to the
genocide in Syria. I will do this by specifically looking at the particular attitudes of the
international community towards the Syrian human rights crisis, the complexity of the conflict,
and the geopolitics of the Syrian Civil War. Lastly, I will evaluate R2P, focusing on the following
claims:
1. States that are most able to intervene usually include Western, liberal states who do not
understand the complex politics/attitudes in the states whose sovereignty is breached.
2. R2P is an ambiguous principle that lacks clear guidelines or exit strategies during
intervention (Busser 2019).
3. Humanitarian efforts by Western states may turn into a military operation based on
acquiring economic or self-serving goods, or simply a cover for self-interested states,
rather than the preservation of human life.

II. Sources of International Law
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During the Thirty Years War, a conflict caused by tension between the Holy Roman
Empire and power in Bohemia, the balance of power shifted in Europe. The Peace of Westphalia
(1648) stated that the king gets to decide the religion (sovereignty) of his country. This
agreement solidified the modern state as a key unit of state organization at the expense of other
political forms. It became the first concept of state sovereignty in international law (Gross 1948).
Sovereignty has evolved to include legal and normative frameworks that constitute the state as
the final authority over its people and territory. It consists of the right to make decisions over all
domestic matters without outside interference. This also is related to the principle of
non-intervention, which limits interference in the affairs of foreign states. In a common
interpretation of international law, norms and principles of international law are always
subordinate to the rights of states. State consent is the crucial element of international law. The
need to consent implies that states can choose to violate international law, or make rules that do
not apply to them (Reisman 1990).
States obey international law most of the time and there is a culture of compliance within
the international system (Foster 1909). States obey international law due to various reasons such
as peer pressure, the promise of future cooperation, preferring tacit rules for interaction,
predictability, the promise of reciprocity, and the shadow of the future. Also, there are various
options for states to enforce different international rules within the theory of realism, including
retorsion, reprisal, demonstration, and intervention (Gardam 1993). Unlike diplomacy and
negotiation, these methods are degrees of force. For future cooperation and prosperity, states
must maintain a reputation as a trusted partner in diplomacy and negotiations.
International law has elements of both common and civil law; however, it is considered to
be sui generis; or of its own kind (Foster 1909). International law is a collection of rules and
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norms that states and actors within the international community are obliged to obey.
International law guides and shapes state behavior, facilitates cooperation among states,
identifies membership in international society, regulates interest (greases the wheel), and
empowers the weak. It can be differentiated from domestic law, which are the rules and
regulations that govern a country and its people. It consists of civil law, which is based on the
application of code, and/or common law, which is based on code and case law (precedent).
International law differs from domestic law because domestic law is hierarchical, whereas
international law is anarchic.
International law takes many forms, including:
● Customary law, which includes state and legal practices. Customary law includes the
customs of states over time. Customary law acquires power over time and through the
widespread applicability of its norms. International customary law dissuades states from
acts of aggression. These rules and customs of the international community develop as
states interact with one another and resolve conflicts. Customary law is distinguished
from newer principles and norms because it has different origins. Customary law has
evolved from the ways states behave, or their customs over time, rather than being a
written source. Rules of customary law consist of internationally implemented practices
that most states obey, such as sending diplomats or granting diplomatic immunity.
● Treaties or written agreements between states that are governed by international law.
Treaties are ratified by a majority of countries, particularly those involved within the
international system (UN members, EU members). The more ratifiers a treaty has, the
more powerful it is. U.S. hegemony means that a treaty ratified by the United States
carries more power. Treaties consist of principles or rules that are widely accepted by
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judges, politicians, diplomats, and other international actors. Treaties usually require best
practices and interpretation, meaning that states are compelled to observe treaties or face
being “ostracized” in the international sphere. This mechanism induces states to change
their behavior in response to perceived or real social pressures, to assimilate and conform
to other states. Treaties, especially ones ratified by multiple states, are the most powerful
sources of international law. Following treaties, customary law is the second most
powerful, and finally, principles are the weakest. \Commentary, or the legal conclusions
of judges, international lawyers, and other legal actors in the international sphere (Villiger
2009).
● Principles and rules, or laws embedded in the international sphere that lack any teeth or
enforcement powers. A legal doctrine or rule of law that is general and abstract,
principles, unlike treaties or customs, have not been posited according to formal sources
of law. However, principles are still considered to be a component of positivist law, and
they constitute necessary rules for the functioning of the international system (Nerlich
2017). Principles of international law do not have the enforcement powers or authority to
ensure that states actually follow them. Hence, R2P (a principle of international law) has
been considered more of a political norm, not a legal one, and so it is significantly more
complex to intervene when human rights violations are committed due to the lack of such
legal guidelines. Therefore, this shows why R2P lacks any “teeth” in the international
sphere, and why it is so difficult to enforce.
R2P, as will be discussed later, is a principle of international law and as such has no real
enforcement power, unlike treaties. Following the outcomes of the 2005 UN Summit, which
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established R2P, principles of humanitarian intervention were formed into three pillars of law,
discussed in detail below.

III. International legal theory
Prior to World War II and the Holocaust, international law had consistently affirmed that
a state’s sovereignty was to be upheld in all cases, and that states had the power to internally
manage their affairs without interference from other international actors. However, after the
conclusion of the Second World War in 1945, international law evolved to normalize relations
within states (Lechner 2017). This shift was driven in part by the Holocaust, where the
international community agreed on a new standard that extremely egregious internal affairs could
be regulated. This consensus was the groundwork for the emergence of R2P as a form of natural
and positivist law.
Positivism is from the Latin root positus, which means to posit, postulate, or firmly affix
the existence of something. Legal positivism is a school of jurisprudence whose advocates
believe that the only legitimate sources of law are those written rules, regulations, and principles
that have been expressly enacted, adopted, or recognized by a governmental entity or political
institution, including administrative, executive, legislative, and judicial bodies (Posner 1998).
Legal positivism is the legal philosophy that argues that laws are nothing more and nothing less
than simply the expression of the will of whatever authority created them. Thus, no laws can be
regarded as expressions of higher morality or higher principles to which people can appeal when
they disagree with the laws. It is a view that law is a social construction. The creation of laws is
simply an exercise in brute force and an expression of power, not an attempt to realize any loftier
moral or social goals. Therefore, from a positivist perspective, it can be said that “legal rules or
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laws are valid not because they are rooted in moral or natural law, but because they are enacted
by legitimate authority and are accepted by the society as such” (Posner 2012).
International law is not fully based in legal positivism, or a philosophy of law that
emphasizes the conventional nature of law- that it depends on social facts and not just legal
merit. Legal positivism can also be governed through a series of norms and standards that states
are inclined to comply with. The positivist thesis does not say that law’s merits are unintelligible,
unimportant, or peripheral to the philosophy of law. It says that they do not determine whether
laws or legal systems exist. Whether a society has a legal system depends on the presence of
certain structures of governance, not on the extent to which it satisfies ideals of justice,
democracy, or the rule of law (Lefkowitz 2020). What laws are in force in that system depends
on what social standards its officials recognize as authoritative; for example, legislative
enactments, judicial decisions, or social customs. The fact that a policy would be just, wise,
efficient, or prudent is never sufficient reason for thinking that it is actually the law, and the fact
that it is unjust, unwise, inefficient or imprudent is never sufficient reason for doubting it (Hart
1994). According to positivism, law is a matter of what has been posited (ordered, decided,
practiced, tolerated, etc.). Legal positivism argues that codes within law are what should be
examined. Legal positivism is the view that law is fully defined by its existence as man-made
law. The function of positive law is to define natural law and make it explicit; to make it
effective through sanctions. The positivist approach has a recurring problem of the separation of
law from moral law and natural law. Positivists criticize the idea that natural laws are inherent in
the concept of law (Posner 1998).
In his 1993 Hague Lectures in Public International Law, Thomas Franck's tour d'horizon
of international law asserts that nations “obey powerless rules'' because they are pulled toward
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compliance by considerations of legitimacy (or "right process") and distributive justice. Some
socio-psychological studies suggest that individuals are much more likely to conform their
behavior to norms to which they have an internal volitional commitment, and that such
commitments are correlated with perceptions that the relevant rule is fair. (Franck 2009,
706-730). Compliance is thus influenced by perceptions of fairness apart from rational
calculations of costs and benefits (Franck 2009, 720). Furthermore, the modern transformation of
sovereignty has remade international law so that international legal norms now help construct
national identities and interests through a process of justifiable discourse. If legal positivists only
consider a standard of written law, they are undermining the power and true impacts of natural
law such as rules, norms, and regulations (Koh 1999).
For example, the European Union was not formed due to any legal guidelines in place
before it, but rather was shaped through like-minded states all of whom agreed to comply and
implement the standards of the organization (Koh 1999). True power in international law is not
limited to military or economic power, but rather through ideas, norms, and compliance.
International human rights law is not enforced through states acting in self-interest to achieve
their own goals, but through a complex transnational legal process consisting of three phases: the
institutional interaction whereby global norms of international human rights law are debated,
interpreted, and ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems (Austin 1948, 65).
This complex transnational legal process plays a large part in enforcing international
human rights law. While this enforcement has fallen short in cases like Rwanda, Bosnia, and
Cambodia, it has the potential to be nurtured into a structure of support in which states can
conduct clear intervention (Nuruzzaman 2013). Therefore, R2P has potential power if it
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eventually becomes a universal standard that states support and follow within the naturalist
context of international law.

Protectionism v. Liberal internationalism
R2P emerges from the philosophies of liberal internationalism, or the foreign policy
philosophy that calls for the intervention of liberal states into other sovereign states in order to
pursue liberal objectives. The aims of liberal internationalism are expanding democratic practices
and free trade, defending democracy from its rivals while protecting and promoting human rights
(Hoffman 1995). Like its earlier iterations of Democratic Peace Theory, liberal internationalism
argues that states should aim to achieve multilateral agreements to promote peace and that it is
the duty of Western, liberal states to intervene in other states in order to stop violence. Liberal
internationalism is problematic in the sense that it “succumbs to the fallacy of believing that all
good things can come together” (Hoffman 1999) or that the theory in practice can be more
harmful than good when a Western state intervenes in another country. In this context, only
Western countries are able to intervene due to the fact that most of them possess the resources to
intervene, unlike non-western states. Such intervention can either include humanitarian aid or
even military invasion (Dornan 2011).
The goal of liberal internationalism is to achieve global structures within the international
system that are inclined towards promoting a liberal world order. It foresees a gradual
transformation of world politics from anarchy to common institutions and the rule of law. To that
extent, global free trade, liberal economics and liberal political systems are all encouraged
(Hoffman 1995). In addition, liberal internationalists are dedicated towards encouraging
democracy to emerge globally. Once realized, it will result in a 'peace dividend', as liberal states
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have relations that are characterized by non-violence, and that relations between democracies are
characterized by the democratic peace theory (Dornan 2011). Liberal internationalism states that,
through multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, it is possible to avoid the worst
excesses of "power politics" in relations between nations. In addition, liberal internationalists
believe that the best way to spread democracy is to treat all states equally and cooperatively,
whether they are initially democratic or not (Powers 2019).
While liberal internationalism encourages states to intervene in conflict in order to
expand democratic practices, its opposite is the philosophy of protectionism or isolationism.
Isolationism includes the policy or doctrine of trying to isolate one's country from the affairs of
other nations by declining to enter into alliances, foreign economic commitments, international
agreements, and generally attempting to make one's economy entirely self-reliant. As a
philosophy, it seeks to devote the entire efforts of one's country to its own advancement, both
diplomatically and economically, while remaining in a state of peace by avoiding foreign
entanglements and responsibilities. Isolationism is criticized by liberal internationalists because
it fails to aid other states with major international troubles. Liberal internationalism calls for
democratic states to try and establish a new global order through establishing democracy in other
states, whereas isolationism takes the opposite approach, namely, that a state should not involve
itself in international politics.

IV. R2P: history and legal status
While R2P is a new principle, the idea that individuals should be held accountable for
war crimes is not. Beginning with the Geneva Convention in 1949, states established the
standards of international law for the humanitarian treatment of civilians during conflict (Kurtha
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1972). They unilaterally agreed that it was the obligation of states to intervene during violent
atrocities such as the Holocaust. This became the first standard for the creation of the
Responsibility to Protect in 2005 (Bellamy 2009). Conflict in the late 20th century furthered the
idea of collective intervention, especially following the genocides in Rwanda and former
Yugoslavia in 1994 and 1992-1995, respectively. During these catastrophic events, violence and
targeted ethnic cleansing was able to proceed unchecked.
Twentieth-century efforts to adjudicate genocide first began following the Second World
War during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. These mass trials were a part of an effort by the
allied forces to try and convict German and Japanese war criminals under international and
military law. Beginning with the Nuremberg Trials, many Nazi war criminals were brought to
justice under counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. One hundred and
twenty-seven defendants were convicted and sentenced to death, including notorious war
criminal Master Sergeant John C. Woods. The Nuremberg trials were the first step towards the
establishment of an international criminal court, and set an important precedent for dealing with
later instances of genocide and crimes against humanity (Cunliffe 2016).
The trials held in Nuremberg became a model for the trials that followed in Tokyo.
Ordered on January 19, 1946, by General Douglas Macarthur, the International Military Tribunal
convened to put leaders from the Empire of Japan on trial for joint charges of conspiracy to start
and wage war (Cunliffe 2016, 4). Arrested Japanese leaders faced charges of war crimes, crimes
committed against prisoners of war, and crimes against humanity. Twenty-five defendants were
found guilty; seven of these were found guilty of inciting atrocities and executed. Both Tokyo
and Nuremberg created a new standard for international justice and set the example for
accountability under international law (Halliday 1988).
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Rwanda & Bosnia
During the second half of the twentieth century, crimes against humanity became more
frequent. In response to this, the international community evolved to include the prevention of
genocide particularly after the Rwandan and Bosnian Genocide. The Rwandan Genocide took
place over about four months in 1994 and resulted in the deaths of more than half a million
ethnic Tutsis by the Hutu (Human Rights Watch 2004). Although UN peacekeepers were present
during the genocide, they were extremely limited in what they could do to intervene without the
approval of the Rwandan Government. After two weeks of civilian massacre, the UN Security
Council (which had established the peacekeeping force in Rwanda in 1993), withdrew all but a
nominal presence of its forces from Rwanda, allowing the genocide to proceed unchecked.
The genocide set a new precedent for how humanitarian aid and intervention should be
conducted. The UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which
indicted 93 individuals and was one of the first tribunals to recognize rape as a form of genocide
(The United Nations 2015). This court was important in developing how the international
community could respond to and prosecute individuals who had participated in genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity (The United Nations Security Council 2010). The
establishment of the court was only made possible due to shifting constructs about genocide in
the international community.
Also during the 1990s, violent conflict broke out in the Former Yugoslavia. Conducted by
Bosnian-Serb forces, and with the backing of the Serb-dominated Yugoslavian army, atrocious
and violent crimes were committed against the Bosniak population (Bosnian Muslims), and
civilian Croatians (Biserko 2012). Estimates of Bosniaks killed by the government forces ranged
between 7,000-8,000 people. Following this, the United Nations would later establish the
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International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) at The Hague, Netherlands (The United
Nations 2015). The ICTY would eventually indict 161 individuals of crimes and would be the
first sitting tribunal to convict a sitting head of government for acts of genocide.
After the violations of human rights in Rwanda and Bosnia, the United Nations sought to
ensure that no such crimes would take place again without intervention (Bosco 2013). In 1994
the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly called for an improved structure of
humanitarian intervention, that is, of a legal system in which other states would intervene in a
sovereign state in order to prevent egregious violations of human rights (Hehir 1977). The
question at the heart of the matter was whether states have immutable sovereignty over their
affairs or whether the international community has the right to intervene in order to provide
humanitarian relief or prevent a humanitarian disaster.
After the 1990s, the United Nations General Assembly determined that systematic and
gross violations of human rights warranted intervention (Biserko 2012). The cries of “never
again” by states following the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, and evidence that the early
decades of the 21st century would continue to be marked by atrocity crimes led to UN
deliberation about the prevention of egregious crimes (Bosco 2013). A number of other
situations featured grave and systematic violations of human rights or international humanitarian
law–by both state and non-state actors–that entailed significant risk of further escalation, or
virulent forms of violent extremism that posed a particular threat to religious and ethnic
minorities (Welsh 2002). The idea that states have a responsibility to intervene in response to
human rights violations such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity emerged from previous notions of humanitarian intervention, as advocated by human
rights groups such as the World Federalist Movement, Human Rights Watch, and Secretary-
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General Kofi Annan. Before the 20th century, the United Nations primarily sent missions to
African countries that had internal conflicts following decolonization or to the Middle East
where cold war proxy wars threatened civilians. While peacekeeping forces were deployed, the
idea that genocide should also be stopped by the international community remained delayed. It
was not until the 1990s that United Nations policy shifted to include the prevention of genocide
(Chandler 2009).
The emergence of the principle
As discussed above, R2P, as an international legal principle, was established by the
United Nations World Summit Meeting in 2005. It was first drafted as a concept in the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. This
commission drew upon the concept of R2P from Francis Deng’s idea that state sovereignty is a
responsibility and affirmed the notion that sovereignty is not just protection from outside
interference – but rather is a matter of states having positive responsibilities for their population’s
welfare (ICISS 2001). The concept of R2P was furthered following the ICISS Commission by
two UN Reports entitled, A more secure world: our shared responsibility (United Nations
Secretary General Report 2004), and, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and
human rights for all (United Nations General Assembly 2005). These reports endorsed the
principle that state sovereignty carried with it the obligation of the State to protect its own
people, and that if the State was unwilling or unable to do so, the responsibility shifted to the
international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means to protect them
(United Nations General Assembly 2005). The official principle of R2P became a staple in
international law during the 2005 high-level UN World Summit Meeting (A/RES/60/1). This
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commission affirmed the principle that international actors must prevent and respond to genocide
and other violations of human rights.
R2P embodies the political commitment of states to preventing genocide, crimes against
humanity, ethnic cleansing, and other egregious violations of human rights (Cunliffe 2016). R2P
is both the legal and political expectation that a state has the responsibility to protect its own
population under its own sovereignty, and if it should fail to do so, other actors on the
international level (states, institutions, etc) have a responsibility to intervene in order to protect
civilians from harm (Fontanelli 2012). R2P is a legal expectation in the sense that it was created
by the United Nations via resolution, although it can also be defined as a political norm in which
states are expected to comply with in order to maintain a good reputation in the international
system. Furthermore, R2P consists of three pillars of responsibility that states have, including:
1. Pillar One: States have the responsibility to protect their populations from genocides,
war crimes, and atrocities.
2. Pillar Two: The wider international community can use its powers to encourage and
assist states in protecting their populations.
3. Pillar Three: If the state fails to protect their own populations, the international
community may intervene to stop genocide and other atrocities.

Universal Jurisdiction and Jus Cogens
The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) following the establishment of the
ICTY and ICTR set a new precedent for how genocide and other humanitarian violations could
be prosecuted. Established by the Rome treaty, the ICC was the first permanent international
criminal tribunal, unlike its sister courts the ICTR and the ICTY, and separate from the UN. The
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ICC's jurisdiction includes genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression, and crimes against
humanity. The court can try individuals from the countries that ratified the Rome Statute or
individuals who have committed crimes in member countries; a state party can refer a situation
within its own territory to the court; or The UN Security Council can refer a situation to the
court. The ICC also has territorial jurisdiction, which includes the territory, registered vessels,
and registered aircraft of states which have either become party to the Rome Statute or accepted
the Court's jurisdiction by filing a declaration with the Court.
The ICC is considered a founding step for R2P. R2P holds that states have the
responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes, and when they fail, the
responsibility falls to the international community. This comes on the heels of the birth of the
ICC, which advocates a similar mission: it is up to the international community to prosecute
crimes when a state cannot. The ICC’s principle of complementarity also holds that states have
the responsibility to prosecute those responsible for mass atrocity crimes committed within their
borders. Only when a state is unable or unwilling to do this will the situation fall under the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Taken together, these two initiatives offer a framework to advance how
the world responds to genocide and crimes against humanity. As a result, the ICC is a product of
liberal internationalism because it aligns with its goal to provide global justice, and is a
complement to and a continuation of the right to protect. Like liberal internationalism, the
reality of the ICC’s mission calls for the disregard of a significant principle in international lawsovereignty. The ICC in implementing its mission violates a country’s internal sovereignty in
order to prosecute human rights violations.
21st-century developments
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As the principle of R2P was developing, the threat of genocide from the government of
Muammar Gaddafi emerged in Libya by following the Arab Spring protests in 2011. Prior to the
Arab Spring, civil society in the Arab world had often been depicted as underdeveloped and
incapable of generating momentum for democratic change (Hehir 1977). The “Orientalist'' notion
that Arabs were predisposed to authoritarianism was certainly facilitated by this conception
(Hamid 2016). As is now clear, however, underneath the facade of order, tensions were mounting
(Kingsbury 2012). In Libya, Gadaffi’s failure to create a strong sense of national citizenship
amongst the population, coupled with his oppressive policies and remoteness, had created a
dangerous disjuncture between the people and the regime (Lynch 2011). While Libya displayed
few overt signs of looming rebellion, people began to critique Gaddafi’s regime, and soon the
first uprising began on February 15, 2011. Such violent outbursts and the cruel disposition of the
regime led to the confirmation by the international community that unilateral peace enforcement
would have to be initiated in order to enact democratic reform (Evans et al. 2013). Already, on
the eve of intervention, the death toll was estimated at somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000, at a
time when the international community’s tolerance for the Arab Spring–related mass killings was
still fairly low (Varvelli 2020).
On February 25th, the UN Human Rights Council convened a special session during
which they condemned the violence and called for Libya to be suspended from the Council. This
decision was motivated by the belief that there was an imminent danger to non-Arab
communities, bordering on genocide, which made the decision for intervention extremely timesensitive (Lynch 2011). The formal suspension, the first of its kind, was unanimously endorsed
by the UN General Assembly on March 1st. As stated in the UN Security Council resolution
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authorizing force in Libya, the goal of the intervention was "to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under threat of attack" (Willmot 2017).
Within the Obama administration, a foreign policy group consisting of then National
Security Advisor Susan Rice, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and former United Nations
Ambassador Samantha Powers. Collectively, Powers, Rice, and Clinton pushed President Obama
for intervention, which, in turn, empowered other states to join the effort, leading to the creation
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO coalition (Powers 2019). Such steps in the
international community eventually led to the passage of Resolution 1973, which condemned the
violence in Libya and expressly permitted the international community the power to “to ensure
the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of
humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel...” (Busser 2019).
Pro-interventionists greeted the Resolution with jubilation, believing the mission could be a
quasi-experiment of the R2P doctrine. Libya became the target for intervention on March 19,
2011, when a NATO-led coalition formally launched a peace-enforcement mission in Libya and
conducted airstrikes against military targets that posed a severe threat to civilians (Homan and
Rogier 2012). After several months of intense fighting, the capital, Tripoli, fell to the rebels and
the Gaddafi government collapsed soon after (Thakur 2011)
NATO actions failed to account for the aftermath of intervention and did not provide a
framework for returning Libya back to normal or peaceful conditions, a circumstance that
highlights the lack of post-intervention action within the R2P doctrine. (Halliday 1988) Although
NATO leaders hoped that Gadaffi’s ouster would mark the end of Libya’s violence, the country
spiraled into even greater chaos. Rebel forces split into competing militias and continued to fight
a civil war that had already left thousands dead and displaced (Tinnes 2014). Today, Libya is
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considered a failed state and a haven for extremist groups such as the Islamic State and
Al-Qaeda. NATO’s role in failing to prevent such conflict has been cited by former President
Obama as the “worst mistake of his presidency” and would impact the future application of R2P
(Williamson 2013).
V. The Syrian Case
Like many other movements in other Arab countries, Syrian student protestors took to the
streets, demanding democracy for their country in 2011. They called for an end to the recent
mass arrests of political prisoners, the abolition of the 48-year emergency law, and an end to
pervasive government corruption. In March of 2011, many of these young protestors were
arrested by the government and tortured, leading to more protests across the country (Howard
2015) In retaliation to the protests, forces of the Assad regime fired on open crowds of civilians
and conducted mass arrests, especially targeting groups of student protesters. (Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights 2015). By the end of 2011, the UN had estimated about 5,000
civilians had been killed in the struggle (The United Nations 2019).
Attention from the international community increased in 2012 when the NGO Human
Rights Watch documented and presented evidence of chemical weapons used against Syrian
civilians. Government forces targeted opposition forces (or those believed to be opposition
forces) as well as home and medical facilities, tortured and killed prisoners, and denied the
injured from life-saving medical treatment. The civil war also resulted in a mass influx of both
internally displaced peoples and refugees. About 6.2 million people, including children, have
been displaced in Syria, and more than 6.6 million people have been officially classified as
refugees and now reside in neighboring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, as
well as in Germany and the United Kingdom (UNHCR 2020). In a report published in 2012,
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Amnesty International concluded that the “deliberate and unlawful killings are part of a
widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, carried out in an organized
manner and as part of state policy” (Amnesty International Ltd 2012).
Moreover, the civil war involves many actors, complicating intervention. Firstly, there are
the government forces that are loyal to Assad, including the militia and other armed foreign
groups, as well as the official Syrian Army. The opposition to Assad is known as the Free Syrian
Army, and is composed of different civilian brigades, which was formed by the first civilians
who took up arms against the Assad regime (Human Rights Watch 2015). The conflict is further
complicated with the presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), composed of
members who are radical jihadists coming from all over the world, eighty percent of whom are
non-Syrian (McCarthy 2019). The objectives of ISIS are completely different from those of the
Syrian insurgents opposed to the Assad regime. ISIS sought to establish a separate Caliphate that
would eventually cover territory in Eastern Syria stretching near the border of Iraq. And lastly,
the Syrian Kurds control the Northwest zone near Turkey. Their military forces are composed of
local combatants, members of the PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian branch of the PKK
(Kurdistan Workers Party), and the Turkish Kurdish party of Communist origin (Tawhida and
Butler 2006).
The civil war in Syria also contains various ethnic tensions that have contributed to the
international community’s reluctance to intervene. Syria is a diverse country containing several
different ethnic groups including Alawite, Sunni, and Shia Muslims, as well as Turks, Kurds,
Arabs, and Assyrians (Heritage for Peace 2015). The Assad family belongs to the Alawite
community, which represents about 10% of the population, but is heavily present in the military
and the government. The Sunni majority which makes up about 72% of the population is
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considered the “majority-minority,” and is denied positions in the government. In turn, the
regime has tried to repress Christian or Sunni groups, creating clear ethnic tensions in the region.
(Ferris 2019)
The lack of international intervention can be partially explained by the complexity of the
conflict. Assad has intertwined extremist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda with the original
rebels in 2014 when he deliberately released 320 ISIS prisoners from the Aleppo Central Prison.
Assad’s goal was to allow an influx of fighters into Syria in order to cloud the narrative of the
war (Becker 2015). As a result, countries that previously considered intervention became
increasingly hesitant to support the Syrian Democratic Forces, given they may be accidentally
supporting ISIS or Al-Qaeda, clearing the way for terrorist groups to gain power after Assad. In
addition, the UN is hesitant to overthrow Assad because of the anticipated power vacuum that
could leave ISIS dominating the country through an Islamic state, a nightmare for Western
powers. (Robinson 2017).
Moreover, the nature of the anti-government forces came under greater scrutiny, and
comparisons with the Assad regime were offered. In this context, ‘‘the rebels’ supporters, which
include al-Qaeda and Hamas, are potentially just as threatening to human rights and stability as
Assad himself—perhaps even more so’’ (Najem 2013). Brutal as Assad is, many international
actors are wondering if the best alternative for the world might not be ‘‘standing by and not
doing very much’ (Najem). Tying in with the uncertainty of what might happen if Assad is
overthrown, it is not entirely clear if it is in Western interests for Assad to be overthrown. One of
the reasons for that was the presence of ‘‘foreign terrorists, Islamic extremists and al-Qaeda
zealots’’ in the rebel ranks, and the other was the likelihood of full-scale civil war if he were to
be forced from office (Robinson 2017).
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The issue of Syria’s chemical weapons enhanced doubts concerning the desirability of the
anti-government groups. With the use of chemical weapons came the question as to whether the
international community would prefer that these weapons fall into the hands of an ill-defined
agglomeration of armed insurgents whose only shared interest is in seizing Assad’s power for
themselves. Furthermore, Syria, it was asserted, was going to fall apart ‘‘no matter what the rest
of the world does,’’ and in the international arena, no other country wanted to be left trying to
use their own resources to put the pieces together again (Najem 2016) Moreover, half- hearted
interventions like the imposition of a so-called, no-fly zone were dangerous and had to be
avoided because they inevitably led to deeper involvement (Soupcoff 2012). Lastly, the
discouraging example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was raised. If the rebels
won, there would be long-term, continued chaos and violence in Syria just as was still occurring
in the DRC. These factors led many to reconsider if intervention in Syria would even be effective
(Najem 2016).
Legally, genocide is defined as the deliberate killing, displacement, or ethnic cleansing of
a particular nation or ethnic group. In Syria, genocide is exemplified by the chemical weapons
used against civilians, the forced displacement of millions, and the capturing and killing of
civilians that oppose the Assad regime. Moreover, the sheer scale of people that have been
forcibly displaced within Syria epitomizes the consequences of the Assad regime remaining in
power. More than five million Syrian civilians have been classified as internally displaced
persons (or IDPs), an astounding indicator of the brutality of the Assad regime and how the
Syrian people have suffered from the conflict. The violent nature of the weapons and the sheer
scale of murder conducted by the Assad government led many to call for intervention in Syria
(Human Rights Watch 2019).
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Internal dimensions were further complicated with the involvement of big powers such as
the US and Russia in the civil war. Any collective action proposed by the UN General Assembly
was effectively vetoed by Russia, whose President Vladimir Putin is allied with President Assad
of Syria. The Syrian regime provides Russia with its only Mediterranean naval base and their
lucrative economic agreements are worth almost 20 billion dollars (Homan & Ducasse-Rogier
2012). Soon after the war broke out in 2011, the US was quick to support the protestors, firstly
providing them with non-lethal aid such as clothes and food. Eventually, the US started
supplying the rebel leaders with weapons and means of intelligence, as well as participating in
the bombing of government holdings in areas like Aleppo and Damascus (Amnesty International
2015). The United States had other interests involving its proclaimed “War on Terror” and
targeted ISIS. In 2014, the Obama administration ran covert operations against ISIS, dropping an
estimated 67 bombs a day in certain terrorist holdings (Institute for Economics & Peace 2020).
Following 2014, Russia (backing Assad) began its first airstrikes in Syria. Although they
claimed to be trying to derail ISIS, many witnesses and members of the opposition parties
reported missiles to be overwhelmingly targeting rebels. With Russian support, the Assad
government was able to regain control of Aleppo. In addition, in 2017, President Trump began
renewing attacks against ISIS and the Assad government, eventually leading to the fall of the
Islamic State. However, the withdrawal of troops from Syria by the U.S. led to several attacks on
Kurdish forces by Turkey, and by the end of 2020 many Syrians were living in destitution, with
many millions more becoming classified as IDPs.
Currently, Syria is still considered a war zone. In February of 2021, President Joe Biden
conducted an airstrike in Syria in order to retaliate against an Iranian-back rocket launch against
the US. Now in its eleventh year, the Syrian refugee crisis is at its worst, with 13.5 million
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displaced. The continued conflict has also created economic despair: families are unable to
secure household products and food and young girls and women commonly become victims of
human trafficking and child marriage.

VI. Argument
In this section, I will make three arguments: First, I will argue that R2P intervention is
problematic because the only states that are capable of intervention are Western, liberal states.
Second, I will argue that R2P is ambiguous and the lack of clear parameters for intervention has
led to disastrous consequences in Libya in 2011 and current-day Syria. Finally, I will argue that
intervention can easily become an operation not based on the preservation of life, but rather, a
military operation based on acquiring economic or geopolitical benefits.
First, in the context of the 20th century and within the philosophy of liberal
internationalism, only Western countries are able to intervene or utilize R2P. Such intervention
can either include humanitarian aid or even military invasion (Dornan 2011). Following the
creation of R2P, liberal internationalists have focused their efforts on advancing the principle.
R2P is a part of the liberal internationalist philosophy because it has a similar purpose (although
its purpose extends beyond just liberal/democratic principles)- to breach a country’s sovereignty
in order to protect civilian populations. Liberal internationalists tend to ignore the flaws of R2P
and of intervention. Liberal internationalists argue that even if intervention is flawed and results
in the placement of another unstable regime (as in Libya), this regime will stop some atrocities
and deepen the general resolution of the global community to stop genocide (Powers 2019).
Liberal internationalists correctly observe that the only viable regime under the existing
hierarchical order is one skewed to the interests and values of the U.S. and other leading powers.
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The apparent appeal, then, of adopting the R2P framework is it enables the advancement of such
a regime (Graubart 2013).
R2P is considered a pragmatic form of liberal internationalism in which liberal or
Western states are expected to conduct intervention in failed states. Liberal internationalism and
R2P pose the threat of making a situation more complex than it was originally (Hughes 2013).
With both liberal internationalism and R2P, states that intervene typically do not understand the
complexities of the situation they are entering, and can oftentimes make the conflict in a country
worse. For example, after NATO intervened in Libya in 2011 and disposed of Gaddafi, they
ended up creating a power vacuum in the government and left Libya as a failed state subjected to
warring governmental parties. As seen in Libya, intervention may lead to unstable power
vacuums, poverty, displacement of civilians, and political unrest.
In addition, liberal internationalism encourages a breach of internal sovereignty by
another country. Sovereignty is therefore challenged by the philosophy of liberal
internationalism. Also, liberal internationalists have generally purged any explicit concern with
the ethical goal of implementing democracy because they have been (excessively) preoccupied
with the mechanics of change within an international system dominated by sovereign states. In
other words, liberal internationalists have privileged questions on the “why” (human rights
violations, lack of freedom) and the “purpose” of intervention, such as liberation, assistance, or
salvation in international relations without much consideration about the methods of which
intervention will be conducted (or the “how”). (Franceschet 2004)
Furthermore, as the Democratic Peace Theory offers: when states become republics and
their citizens are given the opportunity to make decisions, they are less likely to choose to go to
war. It is therefore reasonable to argue that as more states become republics and democracy
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spreads, then the likelihood of war between nations becomes smaller until eventually all nations
view war as irrational and peace triumphs over conflict (Kant 1795; Baylis 2008). However,
intervention by Western countries runs the danger of becoming an expansionist movement in
which democracy is imposed on developing countries. By justifying the imposition of
democratic government on the Democratic Peace Theory, states can intervene in non-democratic
countries, and set up a system of government that ends up hurting more than helping.
The decision to undertake a humanitarian intervention is not only determined by the
gravity of the humanitarian disaster, but also by the desire of states to benefit themselves. Liberal
states tend to undertake such interventions where the humanitarian motive can be combined with
other interests (Lechner 2017) As a result, R2P may easily become an employment of military
and other political agendas, or become a method in which states can practice intrusive
state-building. These practices privilege the ‘international community’ as the dominant agent in
the emancipation of weak ‘victims’ from violent state fragility (Cunliffe 2011). As such, the
orthodoxy of prevailing liberal peace and security discourse marginalizes the very ‘victims’
purported to be at the heart of the R2P doctrine. Hence, by “privileging external, state-based
military intervention and depoliticized capacity-building, over politically-conscious civil society
insurrections, the practice of R2P subverts the politics of the ‘everyday’, which can engender
agency and resistance” (Glover 2011).
The theory of liberal internationalism and the problems surrounding it and R2P can be
exemplified in Syria. When the conflict first broke out, Western states such as the United States
rushed in and immediately backed the Syrian rebels because those rebels desired to establish a
democratic government. However, the United States also had ulterior motives for joining the
Syrian conflict- the extermination of ISIS. The U.S. dropped hundreds of bombs and conducted

27

drone strikes in order to weed out ISIS, but instead would often hit civilian villages. Moreover,
the presence of ISIS made the conflict more complex- the U.S. soldiers could not distinguish
Syrian civilians from secret ISIS supporters. Moreover, due to the involvement of outside states
(as encouraged by liberal internationalism), the conflict in Syria is caught between geopolitics
that make the situation more complex. Russia and China back the Assad regime, while the U.S.,
the U.K., and France seeks to aid the Syrian rebels. Therefore, Russia and China vetoed attempts
to introduce UN peacekeepers. Liberal internationalism and R2P dictate that states have the
responsibility to protect civilians, but this is essentially rendered ineffective by the politics of the
UN and states’ interests in either preserving the Assad regime or enforcing a democratic system.
Furthermore, the early motivations informed by liberal internationalism in Syria failed to
consider the spread of arms, the radicalization of additional civilian populations by our
involvement, the balance of power within the Islamic world between Shia and Sunni forces, the
potential breakdown of state borders across the region, the rival ambitions of regional powers
from Iran to Turkey to Saudi Arabia to Egypt – and the depletion of U.S. “blood and treasure.”
(Schnurner 2014).
Second, in the hierarchy of international law, principles such as R2P are considered weak
due to a lack of legal guidelines and any enforcement power. R2P is ambiguous in the sense that
the successes of the missions conducted using it will always be debatable. Missions conducted
using R2P as a justification will always be marked with partial wins for the international
community as, for example, seen in Libya, where the removal of Gaddafi cleared the way for
political unrest and warring government parties. Its costs, meanwhile, will be painfully evident in
the form of military expenditures and casualties, and in whatever unintended consequences may
follow an intervention. For that reason, the doctrine will struggle to build a record of success and
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to cement its place as an international norm. R2P has not been created to foster an
institutionalized, strongly embedded social structure of responsibility through which such
practices of holding actors accountable might be invigorated or sustained. International law is
constantly shifting to normalize different relations among states, but there is no clear definition
of the principle (Koh 2004).
R2P fails to give explicit guidelines for intervention and is further muddled by the
anarchic quality of the international system which is characterized by the lack of supranational
authority that regulates international order (Lechner 2017; Cunliffe 2016). Furthermore, R2P
lacks a clear “exit strategy” in which the intervention group can safely depart from the state
without causing more chaos. After neutralizing the immediate threat to Benghazi, the NATO-led
coalition provided de facto air support for Libyan rebels, who counterattacked and ultimately
destroyed the Gaddafi regime. This, in turn, provoked an angry response from several countries,
including some that had voted for intervention and now accused NATO of using R2P as a cover
for regime change. The NATO coalition, after disposing of Gaddafi, left a failed state behind,
with no clear leadership. If an operation achieves its immediate goal of protecting a threatened
population, it must then devise an “exit strategy” of one kind or another. The problem, however,
is that the requirements for terminating such a mission are different – and more expansive – than
the initial goal of preventing mass killing. As a result, humanitarian intervention appears to have
a built-in propensity toward mandate-expansion (Thakur 2011).
Despite the original optimism of the international community during the passage of R2P,
the principle has failed to generate effective humanitarian intervention, as seen in Syria for
almost ten years. The violent nature of the weapons and the sheer scale of murder conducted by
the government of Assad led many to call for intervention in Syria. While some individual
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countries such as Turkey, the UK, the U.S., and France have made a number of actions trying to
aid civilians and rebels, no efforts to utilize R2P have been made (Laub 2012). The international
community is once again divided on the appropriate balance between respecting a state’s
sovereignty and protecting human rights. The conflict in Libya and the 2011 NATO intervention
shattered international consensus on humanitarian intervention.
In addition, the lack of international consensus has made it extremely difficult to
intervene. Unlike the Libyan crisis where the U.N. The Security Council voted to impose a
no-fly zone and use “all necessary measures'' to protect Libyan people from Gaddafi. The
Council is not unified on Syria. China and Russia, two Syrian allies, veto legislation that is
designed to condemn the Syrian regime and provide legitimacy for a Libya-like intervention.
Because of this division, intervention through the UN is essentially halted and there would be
effectively no kind of unilateral or NATO operation with international legitimacy. Also, no
country seems to want to act unilaterally. Doing so would result in the depletion of resources,
casualties in the military forces, and economic strain. Therefore, without any international
condemnation (as seen in Libya), intervention in Syria seems unlikely.
The narrative in Syria is not simple enough for Western intervention (Mathias 2019).
Many international actors are wary of intervention in war-torn Syria given the complexity of the
situation coupled with the presence of terrorist groups. Syria is very much divided between the
government and the rebel groups. In 2016, Al-Assad still had 20 to 30 percent support of the
population since many still buy his message that he is fighting terrorist groups who are backed
by an international media conspiracy (Almond 2016). Many of Assad’s supporters are Christians
and Alawites, the Shiite sect to which he belongs. Most of the country’s rebels are Sunni
Muslims. The message that Assad sells his people is that only he can provide protection, while
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the Syrian opposition taking power will result in a mass depletion of resources and the relocation
of civilians. (Almond).
Combined with the ambiguity of R2P, Western states are wary to utilize the principle,
given it could lead to disastrous consequences for the intervening nation. Because R2P does not
give a clear exit strategy, this means that soldiers or any other aid on the ground could get caught
up in a war in which they have no clear way out. R2P’s guidelines for intervention are too
ambiguous for most states to properly utilize, meaning that there is no way of telling what would
qualify as a “successful” intervention.
Third, intervention via R2P may easily become a military operation not based on the
defense of civilians, but rather based on gaining either economical or geopolitical advantages.
Predicated on the liberal logic of international security and underpinned by the dominant trope of
mitigating further state collapse, the invocation of R2P is frequently accompanied by repressive
and exclusionary practices associated with militarization, securitization (Aradau 2008), and
highly intrusive statebuilding (Mansur 2012).
Former President George W. Bush’s invasion into Iraq in 2003 is a prime example of the
abuse of humanitarian power that can come with intervention. This invasion was one of the
starting points of the Iraq War, where initially a U.S. coalition aimed "to disarm Iraq of weapons
of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people."
(Aradau 2008). The invasion of Iraq hence was justified by claims of preemptive war, meaning
that by launching an invasion, the United States aimed to protect both its population and the
civilians threatened by the regime of Saddam Hussein (Hinnebusch 1997). However, after a
bloody mass invasion into Iraq, it was revealed that threats of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) were hollow, and the actual motives and causes (which were not humanitarian) for the
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invasion were shown. Since the war, the deception practiced by the Bush administration has been
exposed; but even before this, it was clear to ex-weapons inspectors and Iraq specialists that
Hussein had no serious WMD capability and certainly not one capable of threatening the U.S.
(Hinnebusch 1997).
The George W. Bush administration did not explicitly cite R2P as a justification for
invasion into Iraq but would ultimately argue that Saddam Hussein’s brutal treatment of many
Iraqis was a reason to overthrow him, as well as promoting democracy (Bardis 1990). Therefore,
humanitarian issues and human rights were used to justify an illegal intervention in which the
Bush administration used to further its own agenda. In his invasion into Iraq, Bush met little
resistance from the international community. This is due to the fact that the international system
lacks a higher authority. Without such authority, there is no one who can decide which cases
merit intervention and which do not. While it is unlikely that Bush’s humanitarian arguments
would have met the standard for R2P, the Iraq war set a precedent for large-scale military
invasions based on humanitarian efforts. (Doer 2008)
Syria also exemplifies how R2P’s initial goals may be muddled by different states. While
the United States has remained steadfast in its support of the Syrian opposition and cited
humanitarian reasons for becoming involved, it has been revealed that the U.S. has ulterior
motives in Syria. The first motive is that the United States has an invested interest in eliminating
the terrorist group ISIS. In 2017, President Donald Trump issued a statement stating that the U.S.
has “very little to do with Syria other than killing ISIS” (Pearson 2019). Although the United
States provides aid to the rebellion forces, their primary interest in the conflict is best
exemplified by the fact that most of the ground troops and assistance the United States provides
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is employed in order to target ISIS forces, rather than helping the rebellion, which the country
cited as its first reason for entering the conflict in 2011 (Pearson 2019)
The second motive of the United States is that it opposes the forces allied to Assad due to
its alliance with Israel. Tensions between Iran and Israel have existed since Iranian leaders have
sought to dissolve the Jewish state. Iranian General Aziz Nassirzadeh, who heads Iran's air force,
said his soldiers are "impatient and ready for a fight against the Zionist regime to wipe it off the
earth," in comments circulated on a news site with links to state media (Pearson 2019). A long
time ally and economic partner of Israel, the United States is determined to keep it safe from a
looming Iranian threat in Syria. Iran has allied itself with President Assad, so if he retains power
after the conflict, Iran could establish a permanent military presence in Syria. Therefore, The US
seeks to block Iran and the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah from establishing a permanent
presence in Syria that could threaten Israel.
Although the United States has cited humanitarian reasons for its efforts in Syria, the last
motive is access to the lucrative oil wells in the Middle East. Under President Donald Trump, the
U.S. has gained access to a politically connected oil company that operates in northeast Syria in
accordance with Trump’s pledge to “keep the oil” produced in the region. Trump repeatedly
spoke of keeping some U.S. troops in Syria to help “keep the oil” and “secure the oil,” but his
aides sought to dispel the idea the United States was trying to profit from the region’s oil
reserves. The U.S. decision to allow an American company to refine and market oil was
denounced by Assad’s government and ally Russia after it became public last August, not long
after then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo acknowledged during the a congressional hearing that
the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria had come to an agreement with an American
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oil company. Moreover, Donald Trump has been transparent in the U.S. interest in oil- “We
stayed back and kept the oil,” Trump told reporters in November 2019.
Other people can patrol the border of Syria ... and Turkey. Let them. They’ve been
fighting for a thousand years. Let them do the border. We don’t want to do that. We
want to bring our soldiers home. But we did leave soldiers because we’re keeping the
oil. I like oil. We’re keeping the oil (Pearson 2019).
The U.S. under Donald Trump had a vested interest not in protecting the civilians suffering under
Assad, but rather in acquiring economic benefits from the Middle East.
In addition, presidential orders issued during the Obama administration had invited U.S.
companies to apply for licenses in agriculture, telecommunications and oil and gas in Syria. The
U.S. has been keeping access to the oil reserves in northeastern Syria, despite their initial claims
that they did not have an interest in the oil. Following the Trump presidency, President Joe Biden
has furthered U.S. inaction in humanitarian aid to Syria. Instead of withdrawing totally or
sending help, the Biden administration continues blockages on trade to Syria, and still benefits
greatly over the oil reserves in the Middle East (Ivanescu 2021). The conflict in Syria has been
relegated by now three consecutive U.S. administrations—long enough that serious
re-engagement would seem too audacious today, as the present domestic constraints on the Biden
administration are unlikely to encourage bold or risk-tolerant initiatives, and the complexity of
the Syrian conflict offers no easy answers (Ivanescu 2021).

VII. Conclusion
While R2P has the potential to prevent gross violations of human rights, it has not been
applied successfully in situations that would merit it (such as Syria), and there is no existing
framework where successful intervention can be implemented without lasting complications.
There will be cases in which mass atrocities occur, but states will continue to decline
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intervention because, under R2P, it could do more harm than good. The inevitable result is
inconsistency in humanitarian aid, which in turn erodes the credibility of R2P. While R2P has the
potential to prevent gross violations of human rights, it has not been applied successfully in
situations that would merit it (such as Syria), and there is no existing framework where
successful intervention can be implemented without lasting complications. However, R2P has set
new precedents for international law and human rights intervention. Prior to World War II,
intervention based on humanitarian arguments (and genocide) was not considered to be a method
of stopping atrocities, and world powers tended to take on isolationist positions in order to avoid
intervention. After the Holocaust and the efforts of humanitarians, international actors began to
build the legal structures to protect individuals from human rights violations by the state. The
birth of R2P echoes this sentiment, and still should be considered a revolutionary principle for its
time. Until it is utilized correctly, however, R2P will remain an ambiguous form of law that has
fallen short in the wake of some of the worst crises in the 21st century, including the Syrian civil
war.
R2P could be more successful with the inclusion of clearer guidelines and more
participation outside of the West. An improved R2P would involve preventive intervention rather
than military intervention at the earliest stages of crisis, as well as an emphasis not only on
military power, but also political, economic, legal pressure in order to stop atrocities. Ideally, the
institutional challenges of R2P would also be reformed to include clearer guidelines on who
should or could intervene, and how to properly conduct intervention. R2P should have a focus on
mobilizing political will, meaning that states would have to be motivated to intervene in other
countries or contribute more funds towards UN intervention. Until then, Syria will continue to
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be caught in a crossfire as the international community debates between how to effectively
intervene in humanitarian crises.
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